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Throughout American history, there has been a tension between conventional and 
unconventional forces on the field as well as between the commanders; we even see this 
at the strategic level.  Force misperceptions created a gap between U.S. conventional and 
unconventional forces that reached a peak at the conclusion of the Vietnam War.  This 
gap has slowly been reduced with the creation and efforts of SOCOM; however, 
inefficiencies in the conduct of major combat campaigns still remain as a result of poor 
integration. 
The Burma Campaign and the Liberation of the Philippines 1942-1945 provide 
two unique case studies in which unconventional forces worked under the overall 
guidance and command of a conventional leader.  Throughout the Burma Campaign and 
the struggle for the Liberation of the Philippines, conventional forces relied heavily on 
the ability of unconventional forces to support and contribute to the overall campaign 
strategy.  Direct and indirect communication, coordination, and autonomy of operations 
between these forces resulted in strategic successes enroute to victory in World War II.  
The coordination and roles of these forces throughout the campaigns provide valuable 
insights and lessons learned that can be applied to today’s forces, who find themselves 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
 
Throughout American history, there has been a tension between conventional and 
unconventional forces on the field as well as between the commanders; we even see this 
at the strategic level.  The United States (U.S.) Armed Forces were designed, structured, 
and equipped for maneuver warfare similar to the militaries of all modern major powers.1  
World War II’s mechanized battles between professional soldiers of various nations 
instilled a conventional mindset or, if you will, a certain attitude regarding how military 
combat should be conducted.  Even as U.S. combat forces in World War II and in later 
U.S. conflicts abroad utilized small “unconventional” forces to disrupt, demoralize, and 
gather intelligence against the enemy in certain instances, the focus of the U.S. military 
remained conventional in nature as these “elite” units were continually reduced in size at 
the conclusion of such conflicts.   
Professionalized Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) roots were established through 
various successes of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II.  Interest in 
organizing units to support foreign resistance movements to the advantage of the U.S. 
began to take shape.  However, the military services backed away from any direct 
involvement with such units due to their reluctance to outwardly associate with the “dirty 
tricks” business.2  As SOF forces eventually grew to be a permanent part of the U.S. 
military forces, military leaders continued to distance themselves from “untraditional” 
forms of warfare, especially in the implementation of unconventional warfare in 
operational and strategic planning.  The Army’s view of low-intensity conflict, 
particularly what it regarded as counterinsurgency warfare’s trivial roles in the two world 
wars and the Korean War, formed the foundation for its approach to Vietnam.3 
                                                 
1 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), 1. 
2 Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2002), 68-69. 
3 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 4-5.  Krepinevich 
terms this philosophy as the Army Concept of war in which two characteristics exist: “…a focus on mid-
intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties…” 
2 
Countless accounts of the Vietnam War have been written offering different 
reasons for why the U.S. was defeated in that conflict.  Disagreements regarding Vietnam 
will not be revisited in this thesis.  However, what conclusively did come out of Vietnam 
was a heightened rift or conflict between conventional and unconventional leaders.  
Leaders in the mainstream military felt SOF acted unilaterally and unprofessionally.  The 
post-Vietnam backlash saw the near eradication of SOF organizations.4  The most 
dominant lesson learned from Vietnam was the attitude “never again.”  Military leaders, 
like General Colin Powell, called upon their experiences in Vietnam to reexamine the use 
of U.S. military force in conflicts abroad.   
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait provided the U.S. military the opportunity 
to display the mainstream military’s lessons learned from Vietnam.  In the early stages of 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of U.S. 
Central Command (USCENTCOM), maintained a tight control on SOF operations in 
support of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.  In the build up to the war, a high 
degree of animosity existed between USCENTCOM and U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM).  USCENTCOM distrusted SOF and regarded them as out-of-
control cowboys; similarly, USSOCOM felt that USCENTCOM was a “do nothing” 
command.5  This created an apprehensive relationship between Schwarzkopf and the 
commander in chief of USSOCOM, General Carl Stiner. 
It would thus be an understatement to suggest that the first integration of 
conventional and unconventional forces in a unified campaign plan since Vietnam began 
on shaky ground.  Schwarzkopf maintained a short leash on SOF throughout the war, yet 
his indifference toward SOF did dissipate and by the end of hostilities he admitted that 
SOF displayed professionalism and had achieved clear successes that contributed 
significantly to the overall victory.6  SOF successfully accomplished direct action, 
reconnaissance, deception, and psychological operations missions, and additionally 
proved instrumental in the training of coalition forces and the rebuilding of Kuwait. 
                                                 
4 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 34-35. 
5 Ibid., 230-231. 
6 Ibid., 231. 
3 
The 1991 Gulf War was a unique situation in which the environment produced 
limited, clear objectives that could be attained by using conventional and unconventional 
forces.  Much different than wars in the past, the coalition objective was to remove 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Armed Forces from Kuwaiti sovereign territory.  This 
desired end state was far less ambiguous than in wars of the past and those we currently 
face, in which regional stability through democracy is the intended end state.  The 1991 
Gulf War likewise showcased American firepower and thus was the perfect battle for 
conventional forces.  Though SOF garnered significant respect and demonstrated 
exceptional capabilities a decade after the DESERT ONE failure, the unique 
circumstances of the Iraq War saw little call for unconventional warfare, instead 
highlighting SOF’s direct action or attritional capabilities. 
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Colin Powell outlined his strategy for the use of U.S. military force.  The key elements of 
his doctrine were that the military was to be used as a last resort, and only when and if 
there were clear objectives, strong public support, overwhelming and disproportionate 
force in comparison to the enemy, and a clearly defined exit strategy.  His doctrine 
emerged from his experiences as a major in the Vietnam War and accorded well with the 
sentiments of the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger.7  Though this doctrine 
pointed to the foundations for success in the 1991 Gulf War, it also affirmed the 
military’s emphasis on attrition warfare – a type of warfare that is counterintuitive to the 
conduct of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. 
Meanwhile, as we’ve since learned, U.S. success in the Gulf War taught the 
enemies of today how not to fight the American military.8  Engagements against 
conventional enemies with regular armies were absent for the next decade; in place came 
U.S. intervention in internal conflicts in countries with repressive or nonexistent 
governments, in which humanitarian assistance and a return of internal stability became 
the objectives.  SOF contributed significantly in conflicts like Somalia, Haiti, and 
                                                 
7 Doug DuBrin,  “Military Strategy: Powell Doctrine – Background, Application and Critical 
Analysis.”PBS News Hour; available from 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/iraq/powelldoctrine_short.html;  Internet;  
accessed 2 February 2006. 
 8 Carnes Lord, “The Role of the United States in Small Wars,” ANNALS of the AAPSS, September, 
1995, 96. 
4 
Kosovo; however, their roles were becoming more conventionalized in nature.  The most 
notable example being Somalia in which “mission creep” led to a humanitarian assistance 
operation morphing into a man-hunting operation in search of the single decisive action 
that would lead to conflict termination. 
Despite the unique unconventional warfare capability that SOF provided during 
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, the Haiti intervention from 1994-
1996, and various other low-profile assistance missions in places like Rwanda and the 
Republic of Georgia, such contributions counted for little given a technological superior 
attritional warfare mindset.  This mindset took hold not only within the conventional 
community, but in the unconventional community as well.  Unconventional warfare 
doctrine did not markedly advance within SOCOM during the 1990’s, remaining 
relatively focused on the conventional, or hyper-conventional, missions that SOF could 
provide.9  This undoubtedly led to an atrophy of unconventional warfare skills within the 
SOF community. 
Today, and arguably in the future, U.S. Forces are faced with far more 
challenging objectives than those of the Persian Gulf War.  Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
necessitate the need to apply the appropriate mixture of forces and capabilities in order to 
establish democratic societies in two traditionally non-democratic countries.  These wars 
will be won through the people of these nations.  In order to accomplish these missions, 
conventional and unconventional forces must more efficiently integrate to better 
effectively utilize all capabilities that each force provides.  This requires commanders in 
both realms to fully appreciate their strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of all 




The purpose of this thesis is to examine successful warfare campaigns involving 
significant conventional and unconventional forces integration, then determine the 
applicability of these lessons learned to today.  The anticipated possible benefits include: 
increased efficiency and effectiveness in campaign combat operations; a more 
                                                 
9 Adams, 287. 
5 
complementary division of labor; inter-dependence versus turf competition; recognition 
of the need for better cross-cultural and operational understanding; enhanced capabilities 
awareness at the C2 level; increased integrated training opportunities between 
conventional and unconventional forces prior to armed conflicts; and enhanced 
coordinated “means” to achieve a common “end”.  The expected general audience 




To write this thesis has required conducting an in depth examination of literature 
devoted to two particular case studies involving the integration of conventional and 
unconventional forces during the World War II Asian campaigns.  This historic period 
offers us the ability to analyze how these differentiated forces’ relationships developed 
within a social context void of the technological instruments and expansive 
organizational structure so prevalent in today’s military.  Relationships were more 
personal, enabling trust to be built that facilitated autonomy of operations within an 
overarching unity of effort philosophy.  Arguably more so than today, these relationships 
were created within an atmosphere of animosity that created friction between the two 
disciplines of warfare while engaged in an environment that required an appropriate mix 
of forces to efficiently and effectively defeat a formidable foe.  Though Afghanistan has 
gained the SOF community accolades, these achievements have most likely still not 
affected the U.S. military’s reluctance to accept a type of warfare other than the 
conventional model.10  Herein lies the relevancy in comparing and contrasting case 
studies 60 years apart.   
The Burma Campaign and the Liberation of the Philippines 1942-1945 provide 
two unique case studies in which unconventional forces worked under the overall 
guidance and command of a conventional leader.  Throughout the Burma Campaign and 
the struggle for the Liberation of the Philippines, conventional forces relied heavily on 
the ability of unconventional forces to support and contribute to the overall campaign 
                                                 
10 Adams, 289. 
6 
strategy.  Direct and indirect communication, coordination, and autonomy of operations 
between these forces resulted in strategic successes enroute to victory in World War II.  
The coordination and roles of these forces throughout the campaigns provide valuable 
insights and lessons that can be applied to today’s forces, who must continuously learn to 
re-integrate as we engage in conflicts abroad. 
 
D. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
This thesis utilizes several terms in an interchangeable fashion for the sake of 
simplicity and literary style.  It is noted that various definitions have been offered over 
the years for many of the terms I use.  Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint 
Special Operations offers a detailed glossary of the many terms used in this thesis.  Listed 
below are the two most prominent:  special operations and unconventional warfare. 
 
1. Special Operations 
Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 
economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no 
broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require 
covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations [SO] 
are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be 
conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of 
conventional forces or other government agencies and may include 
operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special 
operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and 
political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence 
from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence 
and indigenous assets.11 
This definition identifies the current military capabilities of modern “special 
operations” that have become prevalent within the military arena in the last 50 plus years. 
In order to capture the critical effects employed by American guerrilla leaders in the 
Philippines and Detachment 101’s operations in Burma, it is essential to correlate their 
                                                 
11 Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; available from 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05print.pdf; Internet; accessed on 07 February 2006. 
7 
efforts in unison with the SO definition of today.  With this in mind, in an attempt to 
bridge the achievements of the past with the present, this thesis adds to JP 3-05’s 
definition, John Arquilla’s definition of SO, “…military (or paramilitary) actions that fall 
outside the realm of conventional warfare during their respective time periods [emphasis 
added].”12 
 
2. Unconventional Warfare 
These are operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly 
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are 
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees 
by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either be 
conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander’s overall theater 
campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted 
independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives 
and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary 
aspects of resistance movements. UW military activity represents the 
culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil 
populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US 
perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance 
organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national 
security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They 
advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in 
existence to conduct UW and when required, accompany them into 
combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, 
the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and 
psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and 
commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set of 
circumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal 
experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to 
guerrilla warfare or insurgency.13 
This thesis utilizes the terms unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and 
irregular warfare interchangeably.  Defining what constitutes unconventional warfare 
could encompass an entire chapter.  For our purposes, guerrilla and irregular warfare are 
military capabilities interrelated within an unconventional warfare plan.  UW itself delves 
into the political as well as military aspects of the objectives.  In the thesis I use the terms 
                                                 
12 John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (New 
York: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), xv-xvi. 
13 Joint Publication 3-05. 
8 
not only to discuss the operations, but also the forces that are engaged in such operations.  
For instance, irregular forces in the Philippines and Burma were predominantly 
indigenous soldiers under the control and guidance of a small number of American 
soldiers.  In this capacity, they utilized unconventional or unorthodox methods, in 
comparison to the conventional or traditional methods employed by “professional” 
soldiers of that time.  The integration of these capabilities and the subsequent effect of 
acting as a force multiplier laid the foundations for an alternative indirect approach to 




Current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have illuminated the weaknesses that exist 
in the U.S. military’s ability to conduct efficient and effective combat operations outside 
of high-intensity warfare.  This thesis does not propose that the U.S. is failing or will fail 
in conducting these campaigns; such assessments require years of observation before they 
can be truly measured.  However, failure to recognize and correct deficiencies can leave 
the U.S. military debilitated or inadequately prepared for waging war against more lethal 
enemies in the future. 
Efficient and effective conduct of high-intensity and mid-intensity warfare 
requires a disproportionate mix of forces and strategies.  Recognizing and utilizing the 
appropriate mix of forces for a particular environment is essential to achieving success.  
Against an unconventional enemy where battles are won by gaining the population’s 
confidence through adequate security and social interactions, the majority of operations 
must fall within the realm and strengths of SOF in order that SOF complements and 
enhances the strengths of the conventional component.  With conventional commanders 
continuing to remain in leadership positions, strides must be taken to reexamine and 
broaden their understanding of SOF capabilities.  It is imperative that we break down the 
barriers between organizational cultures that inherently inhibit units from effectively 
communicating and comprehending their respective capabilities. 
History has proven that success was often achieved when these forces were used 
synergistically.  Thomas M. Huber acknowledges this merging of capabilities in his 
9 
“compound warfare” framework, as he states, “…complementary interactions between 
regular and irregular forces make compound warfare an especially effective form of 
warfare, one in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.”14  Better integration 
of conventional and unconventional forces is not just essential in the mid-intensity 
warfare currently confronting the U.S. military, but offers a force more suitably prepared 



































                                                 
14 Thomas M. Huber, ed., Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army 









































II. STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION: PHILIPPINES 1942-1945  
A. BACKGROUND  
 
On December 8, 1941, only hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese 
unleashed yet another surprise attack as Japanese aircraft began bombarding military 
installations on the Philippine island of Luzon.  The American forces in place at the time 
fell under the control of General Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. Army Forces 
Far East, who was headquartered in Manila.  MacArthur was initially sent to the 
Philippines in 1935 by President Roosevelt to implement a ten-year defense plan for the 
islands; however, growing American isolationist sentiment and a Philippine desire for 
independence led to the islands being miserably under-defended and their strategic 
location misunderstood by all except the Japanese.15  The Japanese invasion went 
virtually unimpeded as the American and Filipino forces had only enough effective 
troops to establish defensive positions, and were unable to launch any substantive 
counter-offensive.  Over the next several months, MacArthur’s headquarters fell back to 
the Bataan Peninsula and then to the island of Corregidor, from where he eventually was 
ordered to evacuate to Australia by President Roosevelt.  The fall of Bataan and 
Corregidor in the spring of 1942 sealed the fate of thousands of Allied soldiers and 
Filipino citizens alike, as many suffered horrendously from various incidents and 
atrocities, which included: the murderous Death March; starvation and disease at various 
prisoner of war camps (most notably O’Donnell and Cabanatuan); death in the South 
China Sea from American planes and submarines as they attacked unmarked Japanese 
prison ships; and Japanese atrocities committed against anyone thought to aid the 
Americans or Allied nations.16 
Many of those who survived the Japanese push across the island of Luzon began 
to either join newly established guerrilla units or organize units of their own within the 
                                                 
15 Edwin Price Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey’s War: From Horse Soldier to 
Guerrilla Commander (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 1990), 34. 
16 Bernard Norling, The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1999), 81. 
12 
vast plains, mountains, and jungles of Luzon.  These loosely organized units eventually 
formed into the Luzon Guerrilla Army Force (LGAF), with two to three American 
soldiers per unit while the remaining members were of Philippine descent.  Unorganized, 
lacking experience, and void of direct supervision from any decisive authority, these units 
developed to become instrumental to the allied effort.  Over the course of the three years 
when Luzon was under Japanese control, these units waged unconventional warfare 
against the Japanese, provided invaluable intelligence to American forces, and eventually 
reintegrated with U.S. conventional forces after the invasion at Lingayen Gulf and the 
subsequent retaking of the Philippines from the Japanese aggressor. 
This chapter examines the relationship that slowly developed between the LGAF 
units and MacArthur’s conventional Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) command, based in 
Australia.  Worth noting is how the cultural and organizational differences between these 
forces did not hinder accomplishing their objectives.  It thus seems worth asking how the 
forces supported one another throughout the campaign, to include coordination, 
dissemination of information, and joint planning; and how the conditions in the 
Philippines enhanced the ability of these forces to build mutual trust and eventually 
integrate.  In short, this chapter analyzes how all of these contributing factors enabled an 
efficient and effective division of labor between two vastly different forces. 
 
B. OVERCOMING DISPARITIES  
 
1. Cultural Differences 
All the Americans on Luzon were conventionally trained and conventionally 
oriented; however, over time, the necessity and progression of conducting irregular 
warfare led to development of a soldier whose analytical and operational capacity became 
quite different from that developed within a conventional environment.17  Prior to World 
War II, guerrilla operations received scant recognition within the American military 
strategic culture.  The conventional professional soldier often was guided in the belief 
                                                 
17 When stating that little difference existed initially, I am referring to the American soldiers who led 
and joined the guerrilla units.  These were soldiers who were conventional troops one day and, due to 
circumstances, found themselves in an unconventional environment that required rapid adaptation virtually 
overnight. 
13 
that, “True warriors would like nothing better than to take part in a clash of armies on 
empty plains or fleets on the high seas or airplanes in the blue skies, all spheres where 
martial skill can be displayed in its “pure” form…”18  Such notions were a far cry from 
what was required of Luzon guerrillas given that their “sphere” was embedded deep in 
the jungle or high in the mountains, where avoidance of the enemy was paramount to 
survival. 
Many of the American guerrilla leaders felt a great deal of animosity towards 
MacArthur.  Many believed MacArthur had abandoned the Philippines and his American 
soldiers when he left the islands for Australia.19  These strong emotions regarding his 
indifference were handled quite differently by the various American survivors of the 
Japanese invasion.  Some slipped into deep depression and refused to wage war against 
the Japanese while others fought off bouts of depression and focused their anger on the 
Japanese, giving free rein to a selfish, individual desire for pure survival.  The latter 
soldiers tended to believe that MacArthur and American forces would return to liberate 
the islands.  Over time they began to greatly respect and admire MacArthur for his 
insistence on doing all he could to assist the irregular effort.  Whether they were in 
guerrilla camps, working in the fields, or living in the city, many Filipinos likewise 
admired MacArthur.  Indeed, MacArthur was an icon to them, and it was only a question 
of “when” not “if” he would return. 
The people and the environment of the Philippines represented a culture much 
different from the American military culture.  The extreme measures that guerrilla 
warfare demands of individuals, operating independently in an environment often 
underappreciated by larger conventional forces, existed in the Philippines under Japanese 
occupation. 
Professional soldiers have traditionally scorned guerrillas as rude, 
untrained, undisciplined, and unreliable; likely to be poachers, smugglers, 
convicts, or bandits more interested in plunder than victory; frequently 
more terrorists than soldiers; corrupted by personal and political 
                                                 
18 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace:  Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), 282. 
19 Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 28-29. 
14 
ambitions—in short, mere murderous outlaws rather than gentlemen who 
wage war in at least a semichivalrous fashion.20 
MacArthur was as conventional a soldier as one could find during his era.  
However, he possessed a rare understanding, affection, and respect for the Philippine 
people that grew out of his family’s history in the islands.21  This cultural understanding 
of the locals enabled MacArthur to appreciate and fully support the roles that LGAF units 
undertook during the three years of his absence.  MacArthur never questioned Filipinos’ 
loyalty and the same was true for the Filipinos as well: “there is no doubt that the 
character, personality, and deeds of Douglas MacArthur had contributed significantly to 
the pro-Americanism of most Filipinos, since they idolized the famous general.”22 
To understand how best to efficiently and effectively use an unconventional force 
first requires an understanding of the localities and populace within the area of 
operations.  Nobody understood the localities and populace better than MacArthur.  He 
appreciated not only the tactical utility that the guerrillas could provide Allied Forces, but 
also the LGAF’s ability to sustain and increase the morale of an occupied people who 
would provide invaluable assistance as the Allied Forces invaded and began the retaking 
of the Philippines in 1944.   
 
2. Organizational Differences 
The overall structure of the LGAF units was extremely ad hoc.  Units arose 
separately and often remained independent.23 Despite a loose structure that often created 
confusion when disseminating information between irregular and regular units, many 
units were nonetheless able to coexist over a long period of time while continuously 
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staying focused on the mutual end state of eventual liberation.  To explain the success of 
these forces requires a slightly more detailed examination of the contributing factors of 
environment, autonomy, and professionalism. 
Of the American personnel who survived the Japanese invasion and began 
forming these guerrilla units, none possessed previous experience or instruction in 
organizing, training, or leading irregular forces.24  This lack of organizational knowledge 
initially left interaction among the individual guerrilla units in disarray as many 
attempted to organize all units under one command, similar to the only organization they 
knew: the U.S. Army.  However, Robert Lapham, for one, argued that a loose 
organization was the only kind that could efficiently work within the environment that 
then existed.  Every leader in every area had problems that were unique to his situation.  
A central authority issuing orders and unsolicited advice would not improve the 
situation.25  The resultant structure thus varied drastically from that of the traditional 
army.  Also, because the irregular units had a clearer picture of the Philippine situation it 
was necessary that authority and autonomous conduct of operations remained “pushed 
down” to the lower levels of the irregular units in the field. 
Once sustained communications were established in 1944, SWPA allowed the 
individual units to flood it with intelligence reports so that situational awareness could be 
developed at higher echelons.  SWPA had the manning to digest the many reports that 
came pouring in from individual units and, once situational awareness was developed, 
SWPA began to seek specific intelligence by addressing its taskings to “all guerrilla 
leaders.” 
Together, irregular units and SWPA informally formed a divisionalized 
organizational structure.  This type of organization incorporates individual units that 
develop their own independent structures suited to their specific requirements.  
Autonomy remains pushed down to the individual units; however, some supervision or 
control must remain in order to ensure a unity of effort across the organization.26  This 
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type of organization enabled SWPA to standardize the intelligence it was collecting from 
irregular units, while ensuring that the units continued to conduct business autonomously 
for the overall strategic objective. 
 
C. SUPPORTING ROLES 
 
1. Eyes and Ears on the Ground 
From the fall of Bataan and Corregidor to the invasion at Lingayen Gulf, the 
irregular forces in Luzon were the only means that SWPA and the political leaders in 
Washington possessed for being able to accurately assess the situation on the ground.  
The LGAF’s primary mission area from the start was one of intelligence gathering, which 
consisted primarily of enemy troop concentrations and movements, beach defenses, air 
base sites, propaganda, and changes in Japanese habits or morale.27  MacArthur 
encouraged the irregular units to hone their intelligence gathering skills early on with the 
understanding that this would prove useful at a later date.  Though raids on the Japanese 
could prove valuable as a morale booster for the irregulars and Filipino civilians, the 
disadvantages outweighed the advantages.  Such attacks would have few discernible 
effects over the course of the war without reinforcements by regular forces and more 
often than not would lead to heavy irregular losses and Japanese reprisals against 
civilians.28 
Ultimately, the initial guerrilla effort in Luzon can be summarized as playing an 
indirect role with long term implications, both operationally and strategically.  
Operationally, low-key intelligence gathering would enhance planning and execution of 
MacArthur’s southern island-hopping campaign and prove crucial once the invasion of 
the Philippines began.  Additionally, Filipino civilian assistance would be essential to 
ensuring an efficient and effective sweep across the Philippine islands following the 
invasion.  If the irregulars had taken a stronger direct action role against the Japanese, 
Japanese reprisals might well have damaged the Americans’ ability to garner the civilian 
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support that proved so invaluable after the invasion.  Strategically speaking, the less 
obtrusive engagement by the irregulars enabled Washington to remain focused on the 
European theater of operations.  If the LGAF continuously succumbed to small-scale 
losing battles against the Japanese, public opinion and concern may have been distracted 
from the primary Allied objective of defeating Germany in Europe first.29 
 
2. Supplying the Effort 
The military damage sustained from the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor left the 
U.S. even more unprepared to respond effectively to other attacks elsewhere in the world, 
let alone in the Philippines, with the appropriate amount of support and force required.  
Once American forces surrendered in the Philippines and the decision was made to 
engage Europe and Hitler first, the Pacific theater was clearly a lower priority for 
supplies and support.  Throughout the first half of the war, MacArthur could not supply 
the guerrilla movement due to a scarcity of resources, resources that were not even 
available for his own campaigns in New Guinea.30  The American soldiers on the ground 
in Luzon would have to figure out what to do with little external support.  During this 
phase of the war, MacArthur could offer moral encouragement but scant material aid, 
which was yet another impetus for focusing primarily on intelligence gathering rather 
than combatant roles. 
In Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines, Ray Hunt 
describes the initial stages of the flow of supplies from SWPA and the effect these had on 
guerrilla operations.31  In mid-1943, MacArthur appointed General Courtney Whitney to 
take charge of the Philippine Regional Section tasked with monitoring and supporting 
guerrilla operations.  This began the start of a flow of supplies, delivered by submarines, 
to the Philippine islands that would continue up through the American invasion.  The 
equipment included hundreds of man-pack radios; American propaganda items, to 
include packages of cigarettes, gum, candy bars, matches, and toothpaste, all imprinted 
with MacArthur’s famous promise “I shall return”; guns; ammunition; and clothing.  
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More significantly, in order to ensure the efficient use of the provided supplies, Whitney 
had close to 500 men of Filipino descent trained in radio operation and maintenance, 
weather and plane observation, and sabotage smuggled into the Philippines to support 
and aid in the training and recruitment of guerrillas. 
The incoming supplies from the SWPA afforded the guerrillas the ability to 
increase the size of their units across Luzon by obtaining and distributing the newly 
acquired weapons and training.  This increase in supplies was the first signal that 
operational integration for the invasion was rapidly approaching.  Additionally, American 
propaganda with MacArthur’s promise to return was circulated and added to the 
legitimacy of the irregular forces in the eyes of the Philippine nationals.  This endearing 
of the irregulars to the populace enabled an expansion of the intelligence network, along 
with enhanced protection and support.  Possibly even more critical than the effect on the 
populace was the effect that MacArthur’s promise of imminent return had on the ground 
level soldiers.  The guerrilla leaders and their forces yearned for recognition from 
MacArthur, and now, not only was there incontrovertible evidence that MacArthur 
remembered his forces, but that he appreciated their activities, sacrifices, and the unity of 
effort in which he would soon join them.32 
 
3. Force Multiplier 
Meanwhile, the LGAF units formed up in the Philippines provided MacArthur 
with the “ammunition” he needed to convince the decision makers in Washington that it 
was in the best interests of the campaign to retake the Philippines and not bypass the 
islands.  In the summer of 1944, MacArthur argued that it would be a political disaster to 
land at Formosa and not liberate the U.S.’s Filipino allies.  To add credence to this 
argument and support for his plan, “[h]e also contended that hundreds of thousands of 
Filipinos would immediately extend every aid to an American invasion force and that 
guerrillas in the islands would augment U.S. combat strength, advantages that would not 
exist on Formosa.”33  In essence, the guerrilla units provided MacArthur with an advance 
force to the invasion and then a force multiplier after the invasion. 
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At the same time, the presence of the guerrilla units drastically shaped Japanese 
operational strategy concerning the defense of Luzon.  The Japanese originally had 
planned on a heavy defensive position in the central plains north of Manila, intending to 
force a major battle against invading forces there.  However, with guerrillas estimated to 
be in excess of 40,000, the majority of whom were in the rear of the Japanese lines, the 
Japanese were forced to alter their strategy and set up their position along the eastern and 
northern mountains of Luzon in an attempt to limit the ability of the guerrillas to disrupt 
their operations. 34 
The psychological impact that the LGAF forces had on the Imperial Army is 
difficult to measure.  However, three years of intelligence gathering, observations, and 
harassment raids by the guerrillas could only suggest to the Japanese that these guerrillas 
knew the Imperial Army’s weaknesses and were acutely aware of its vulnerabilities.  This 
meant they had to plan for dealing with the guerrillas in addition to an invasion force — 
which amounted to worrying about multiple fronts. 
MacArthur was able to use the irregulars to maximum capability because he not 
only understood his enemy (the Japanese), but he recognized what the guerrillas could 
provide to his invasion force.  One day prior to the Lingayen Gulf invasion, MacArthur 
radioed to one of the LGAF unit leaders, “Starting immediately, destroy enemy wire 
communications, railroad tracks, rolling stock and trucks, planes concealed in dispersal 
areas, ammunition, oil and supply dumps…Unleash maximum possible violence against 
the enemy.”35  The low-key force that could not afford prolonged combat operations 
against the Japanese for the three years prior to the invasion now had the commander of 
SWPA’s permission to fully engage the enemy. 
Under the command of Lt. General Walter Krueger, the U.S. Sixth Army landed 
at Lingayen Gulf unopposed on January 9, 1945 and soon began its push across Luzon 
towards Manila.  Prior to the landings, guerrilla units had reported the atrocities 
committed by the Japanese against allied prisoners at various POW camps across Luzon. 
One of these camps was located five miles outside of Cabanatuan City, which rested only 
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25 miles from the forward edge of the battle lines by the end of January.  Krueger feared 
that the swift American advance would lead the Japanese to massacre the 512 allied 
prisoners held at Cabanatuan in order to hasten their retreat; thus, he tasked his 6th Ranger 
Battalion to coordinate with local guerrilla units and conduct a raid to rescue all POWs in 
the camp.36   
The raid itself could not have been launched were it not for the sustained presence 
and intelligence-gathering of the guerrillas over the past three years.  Not only did they 
know all of the specifics about the camp lay-out, condition of the prisoners, and guard 
strength, but the vast intelligence network that had been created over the years provided 
continuous updates and offered protective shelter to the assault force.  In this sense it 
wasn’t just the irregulars themselves who were force multipliers, but also the villagers 
who they had relied on and collaborated with.  Villagers supplied the raiding force with 
food and water as they crossed over 25 miles of terrain.  The guerrilla units, meanwhile, 
also assisted the 6th Ranger Battalion by acting as a blocking force at two sensitive areas 
where enemy encampments existed. The blocking force essentially denied the Japanese 
the ability to respond to the liberation of the POW camp with a quick reaction force.  
Ultimately, the guerrilla involvement in the Cabanatuan raid enabled Americans who 
otherwise would have been unfamiliar with the environment and the populace to conduct 
a swift, efficient operation.  It represented a perfect lash-up between unconventional and 
conventional capabilities. 
 
D. PHILIPPINE ANALYSIS 
 
1. Absence of Alternatives 
The use of guerrilla units in the Philippines and their subsequent integration into 
the U.S. 6th Army was not a preplanned, conscious choice, but derived from an absence 
of alternatives.  These were soldiers left behind by an unprepared U.S. Army that lacked  
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sufficient resources to fend off a Japanese invasion.  These individuals were not just 
abandoned, but their rescue – the rescue of the Philippines - was prioritized below that of 
the European Theater. 
As a consequence, the conventional military had no choice but to allow these 
forces to act in a completely autonomous manner, for who can direct someone how to 
survive?  No interference from outside commands, along with growing logistical support 
enabled guerrilla units on Luzon to effectively work by, with, and through the Filipino 
people.  In a three year period, the guerrillas’ intelligence networks had grown so 
extensive that scarcely a village on Luzon was not sympathetic to the cause against the 
Japanese.  Creating this type of control over a large area required a culture, organization, 
and tactics that would have been alien to the conventionally-minded SWPA command.  
In the end, it was a fortunate irony that the inability of conventional forces to interfere 
enabled the LGAF units to develop over time, with small victories eventually building to 
the Allied invasion. 
Liddell Hart defines the indirect approach as one that seeks to dislocate the 
enemy’s balance in order to produce a decision.37  The LGAF units effectively did this 
prior to the American invasion in 1945.  Inherent to most indirect approaches is the 
necessity of time or protraction.  Conditions granted this on Luzon.  The unavailability of 
resources and lack of priority facilitated the time necessary to conduct indirect insurgent 
warfare.  Without the constraint of only being able to use an indirect approach, it is likely 
SWPA commanders would have chosen a more attritional direct approach with disastrous 
results. 
 
2. Environmental Conditions 
The conditions in the Philippines certainly were favorable to the success of the 
irregular units.  The Americans and the Filipinos had a long established working 
relationship.  American presence for 40 plus years enabled the Americans to understand 
and appreciate Filipino culture and allowed the majority of Filipinos to learn English, 
thereby facilitating communications.  Americans were also not regarded as occupiers, but 
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more as care-takers ensuring a smooth transition to Filipino independence, as promised 
prior to WW II.  No one better embodied this American-Filipino relationship than 
General MacArthur himself.  The Filipino people wholly believed in MacArthur, and he 
was, without a doubt, an icon throughout Filipino society.  Their affection for him was a 
direct reflection of the fact that he understood his followers perfectly.38  This 
understanding and affection for the Filipino people led to a synergy between him, their 
cause, the LGAF efforts, and an unswerving dedication to retake the Philippines fueled 
by his personal feelings of betrayal.  Lastly, the Japanese continuously alienated and 
enraged the Philippine people through the atrocities they committed over the three year 
occupation.  Some feel that the Japanese failed to sufficiently exploit MacArthur’s 
abandonment and perceived betrayal of the islands.  The Japanese could have used this 
along with their claim they were liberating the Asian nations colonized by Europe and 
America.39  However, by never understanding and embracing the Filipino people, the 
Japanese merely added fuel to the fire.  Without engaging the people peacefully, the 
Japanese facilitated an environment favorable to the American-Filipino cause throughout 
their three year long occupation. 
 
3. Division of Labor 
Finally, the operational and strategic advantages that occurred thanks to the 
division of labor between the guerrilla units and the conventional army provided the 
foundation for success throughout the campaign.  Successful campaigns seek not only 
effectiveness, but efficiency as well.  In military operations, efficiency requires the 
planner to use his mix of forces in the appropriate manner to reduce casualties and swiftly 
attain the objective.  All too often in American history military leaders have used the 
wrong mix of forces, yet still achieved “effectiveness” by throwing numbers of troops at 
the conflict and winning through pure mass against heavily fortified, but outnumbered 
enemies.  World War II provides many examples of just such scenarios.  However, the 
Liberation of the Philippines presents an alternative. 
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Former guerrilla leader Robert Lapham affirms the idea of the success of attrition 
warfare by acknowledging that the Allied effort would have still achieved victory in the 
Philippines without the use of irregular forces.  What remains undeniable, though, is the 
many American and Filipino lives saved through the efficiency provided by regular U.S. 
troops and irregular troops fighting side by side and complementing one another’s 
strengths and weaknesses.40  Irregular forces provided the conventional troops with 
intelligence, guides, local support, and augmentees of troops, while the conventional 
forces provided the supplies, support, and legitimacy required to conduct sustained 
irregular operations.  The Philippines provides an exceptional example of how these two 
differently organized and differently oriented forces supported each after having been 
physically cut off and separated, to being fully integrated during the Cabanatuan raid and 
subsequent push across Luzon.  
                                                 


























III. OSS INTEGRATION:  BURMA 1942-1945  
A. BACKGROUND  
 
In 1937 the Japanese invaded China and over the course of two years of fighting 
secured and controlled all major ports and cities on China’s coastline.  The U.S.’s only 
direct logistical route to supply the Chinese army was along a monumentally difficult 
logistical route that came via sea to the port of Rangoon, from which supplies would then 
travel by rail alongside the Irrawaddy River, turning east across the mountains into 
Lashio, where they would then travel the Burma Road to Kunming, China to assist the 
armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.41  Within days after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the bombing of the Philippines, and the subsequent invasion of the Philippines, 
Japan invaded Burma in hopes of isolating the Chinese from any external support being 
provided by the Allied forces.  The Japanese invaded Burma from the south through 
Thailand and quickly overwhelmed a contingent of ill-prepared British, Indian, and 
Burmese forces. 
Major General Joseph W. Stilwell arrived in China in March of 1942 to assume 
the Chief of Staff position of Allied Forces under Chiang Kai-shek.  In a late attempt to 
stop the Japanese advance and defend the Burma Road, Stilwell entered Burma with two 
Chinese divisions.  Out-numbered and out-skilled, Stilwell’s forces, along with the other 
Allied forces, were swiftly defeated as Mandalay fell to the Japanese in May.  Cut off 
from supplies and routes back to China, a humiliated Stilwell and his staff walked out of 
Burma to safety in India.  General Stilwell’s summary of the defeat in Burma was, “I 
claim we got a hell of a beating.  We got run out of Burma and it is as humiliating as hell.  
I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back, and retake it.”42  These comments, 
combined with the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater being relegated as a low priority in 
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the war effort, played a major role in Stilwell’s decision to accept and utilize unorthodox 
methods to fight and defeat the Japanese. 
Detachment 101, of the newly formed Office of Strategic Services (OSS), proved 
to be just the unorthodox force that could enhance Stilwell’s ability to construct a new 
lifeline to China with the building of the Ledo Road.43  Detachment 101 provided 
invaluable support to American, British, and Chinese forces throughout the Burma 
Campaign.  By recruiting, training, and utilizing indigenous Kachins of Burma, 
Detachment 101 established not only a viable force to be reckoned with, but also a 
network similar to that of the Luzon guerrillas.  Detachment 101’s Kachin guerrillas 
provided intelligence gathering, advance force capability, and stood ready to engage in 
sabotage, CAS, and CSAR operations.  Throughout the war, Detachment 101 conducted a 
pattern of operations that often included a force ratio of 300 native and Chinese soldiers 
to four Detachment 101 personnel.44  This utilization of economy of force enabled the 
Allied commands to maximize their forces during a time when most assets, resources, 
and soldiers were concentrating on the Normandy landings with OPERATION 
OVERLORD preparations.  Again, as in the Philippines, the inability to conduct a large 
conventional land assault early on required an unconventional approach that ultimately 
led to the defeat of the Japanese in Burma.   
The Burma Campaign shares many similarities with what occurred in the 
Philippines between the guerrillas and SWPA command.  This chapter examines how 
organizational and personality differences created initial friction between the different 
units.  However, with Burma’s designation as a lower priority and the subsequent limits 
on available resources, decision makers were forced (again) to develop and accept an 
unconventional solution.   Paramount in establishing this unconventional option was 
General William J. Donovan, founder of the OSS, and his influence at the National 
Command Authority (NCA) level.  Donovan’s ability to recognize the requirements, 
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convince the national and operational decision makers, and organize an unconventional 
unit to implement a new strategy enabled the Allied forces to reap the benefits that proper 
economy of force offers.  In conclusion, the Burma Campaign offers valuable insights 
into the inner workings of a conventional command with authority over an 
unconventional unit and how these diverse units integrated to maximize the use of 
foreign forces to achieve victory. 
 
B. OSS’S INCEPTION INTO THE BURMA CAMPAIGN  
 
1. Personalities 
The two most notable personalities who contributed either directly or indirectly 
during the Burma Campaign were General Joseph W. Stilwell and General William J. 
Donovan.  These two charismatic figures provided some of the crucial building blocks for 
developing and implementing an unconventional strategy.  Their combination of 
innovative vision and brashness with little regard for consequences proved to be an ideal 
match for the time and circumstances.  Though at times Stilwell’s overbearing persona 
caused problems, these two men displayed a willingness to place ingenuity ahead of a 
more singularly conservative, conventionally-oriented strategy for victory.  Thus, it is 
essential to examine more deeply the traits of these leaders in the performance of their 
duties at both the strategic and operational levels. 
Unlike most of his counterparts, “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell was uncommunicative by 
nature, and therefore lacked the traits of articulateness and persuasiveness.  He regularly 
resented having to explain operational proposals and actions to his superiors who he often 
regarded as rank amateurs on the subject.45  A characteristic that did embolden Stilwell to 
accept ideas regarding an indirect approach to a problem was his ability to not remain 
narrowly focused on a conventional solution.  General George Marshall recruited Stilwell 
to the Infantry School at Fort Benning specifically for his ability to experiment, to accept 
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new solutions, and to welcome the unorthodox if it showed promise.46  This is not to say 
that Stilwell was a complete unconventional thinker, it merely suggests that under the 
right conditions, with few options, Stilwell was not averse to stepping beyond the 
“conventional box.”  This may be attributed to his experience in World War I and the 
subsequent early stages of transformation, during the period between the wars, as 
everyone sought to avoid the brutality of trench warfare.  In any event, early on Stilwell 
demonstrated a willingness to diverge from the norms when challenged with a unique 
situation. 
Such a situation revealed itself with Stilwell’s defeat in the first Burma 
Campaign.  “For Stilwell, the bitterness of defeat roused him to remarkable feats of 
energy, with ambitious plans to build up the remnants of the Chinese 22 and 38 Divisions 
to a force that could re-enter northern Burma and open up a road to China.”47  Stilwell 
understood that he would be fighting a war with mostly limited numbers of foreign and 
American troops due to the unwillingness of the U.S. to plan for an Expeditionary Force 
into Burma.  This lack of American-trained and quality soldiers left Stilwell open to 
unconventional ideas and his subsequent push for small units of personnel to train and 
equip the Chinese Divisions attracted the attention of then-Colonel William J. Donovan.  
Donovan would soon propose his own visionary ideas to Stilwell that would elaborate on 
and improve Stilwell’s Northern Burma plan, to include the preplanned integration of 
Stilwell’s conventional forces with Donovan’s unconventional Detachment 101. 
William J. Donovan was a man with an unclouded vision of warfare; specifically, 
he believed that a centralized intelligence agency was required to gather and analyze 
information beyond just the short-term operational or tactical level that the Army and 
Navy intelligence units offered.  In a memorandum to President Roosevelt dated June 10, 
1941, Donovan expressed his concern for the inadequate strategic value that these branch 
units offered: “…these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that 
accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can 
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plan for the future.”48  Though Donovan’s plan received condemnation from Army Chief 
of Staff General Marshall, President Roosevelt’s confidence in Donovan’s philosophy 
provided the approval to organize the position of Coordinator of Information (COI). 
Despite his backing from President Roosevelt, Donovan often had to fight off 
attacks from the military brass who felt that the COI was simply trying to horn in on the 
war.49  The charismatic Colonel soon realized that in order for his organization to 
survive, he would have to take necessary actions to make his unit attractive to the 
military.  This opportunity came with Stilwell’s defeat in Burma.  After acquiescing to 
Stilwell’s choice for the Detachment 101 commander in order to receive the General’s 
approval of COI’s intelligence and irregular warfare plans for Burma, Donovan 
immediately petitioned President Roosevelt to place the COI under the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS).50  Donovan understood that in a wartime environment he would have to give 
up some of his autonomy and further integrate with the military to effectively launch the 
unorthodox operations he envisioned.  On June 13, 1942, President Roosevelt abolished 
the COI and created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by Donovan and 
under control of the JCS.  Donovan’s tireless efforts ensured that some medium of unity 
of effort would arise from the joining of the OSS and JCS.51  His personal connections, 
distinguished military career, and imperturbable attributes created the foundations for the 
integration of special operations and conventional forces, at least in Burma.  The men 
chosen to lead Detachment 101 likewise had similar traits and some had preexisting 
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2. Organizational and Cultural Differences 
The organizational structure in Burma was much different than that developed in 
the Philippines.  The organizational structure of Detachment 101 was not sporadically 
spread across an area with no decisive central authority, as was the case with the LGAF.  
Nevertheless, the overall conventional structures of sub-organizations across Southeast 
Asia did grow quite confusing.  Stilwell wore four hats: Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander (SAC); commander of Americans in CBI; Chief of Staff to the 
Generalissimo; and operational commander of Northern Combat Area Command 
(NCAC).  Detachment 101’s unconventional role would fall directly under operational 
control of General Stilwell’s NCAC.  Initially, however, wading through the myriad of 
undermanned headquarters often caused friction as these staffs attempted to engulf the 
Detachment 101 officers for their own needs.  Most staffs could not understand why 
these officers were wasting their time on such menial operations as guerrilla warfare and 
espionage.  “Their thinking was along conventional military lines, and anything to the 
contrary was sacrilegious.”52 
This conventional mindset still occasionally emerged in Stilwell even though he 
had approved Donovan’s operational plan for Detachment 101.  The General had his 
doubts concerning the unit’s ability to integrate and assist in his overarching Burma 
campaign.  In their first meeting, Stilwell was resolute in his belief that Colonel Carl 
Eifler’s Detachment 101 unit had no place in Asia, let alone Burma.  However, soon after 
that first meeting, Stilwell reluctantly gave the colonel 90 days to develop and execute an 
intelligence and guerrilla-warfare operation behind Japanese lines.   Stilwell’s initial 
directive for Detachment 101 was broad in nature as he directed Eifler to establish a base 
camp in Northeast India to deny the Japanese use of or access to Myitkyina airport and to 
liaise with the British in order to coordinate operations and avoid mutual interference.  
Stilwell’s previous relationship with Eifler most likely contributed to his decision to  
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allow Eifler to operate and plan semi-autonomously.  Ultimately, Stilwell’s expectations 
for Detachment 101 were summarized in his statement to Eifler, “All I want to hear are 
booms from the Burma jungle.”53 
Through coordination and advice from the British, Eifler decided to establish 
Detachment 101’s secret base in Nazira, Assam.  The site was chosen for its ideal 
location away from British and American Army installations so that guerrilla-type 
training could take place without worrying about inquisitive eyes or questioning from the 
conventional forces in the area.  Unlike the conventional Allied forces, Detachment 101 
took advantage of the knowledge that the Kachins provided concerning the jungle 
environment, terrain, and enemy methods with which the Detachment 101 operators were 
themselves unfamiliar.  Instead of relying solely on the secret texts and training manuals 
based on espionage and guerrilla experiences in Europe, Detachment 101 utilized the 
Burma natives’ experiences to develop a training program and operational concept 
conducive to the Burma environment.54  Such sharing of information provided 
Detachment 101 the ability to create an organization designed specifically to match the 




Coordination among the multitude of Allied forces commands was a constant 
consideration for Detachment 101 and its guerrilla bands.  Over the course of the 
campaign, the relationship between Stilwell and British commanders became strained.55  
Stilwell had explicitly directed Detachment 101 to coordinate its operations with the 
British, most likely in an attempt to reduce his interaction with those commanders.  This 
effort was often accompanied by friction and a lack of two-way communications.  Most 
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communication problems were the result of personality differences, underappreciation of 
roles, or the British commanders’ assumption that they were the lead force in what had 
been a British colony.  Detachment 101 was in the unique position of having to operate 
under Stilwell’s guidance while simultaneously de-conflicting with the other Allied 
forces commands. 
Coordination with Stilwell consisted of radio communications and personal 
meetings with the general at his headquarters located in the Hukawng Valley.  Upon the 
initial formation and training of indigenous forces, Detachment 101 utilized their 
ingenuity to design man-pack radios from spare parts acquired through Service of Supply 
warehouses in Chabua and the Indian civilian market in Calcutta.56  These radios allowed 
the units in the field to feed situational and intelligence reports back to Nazira during 
their preliminary operations, where they were forwarded to Stilwell’s command.  
Whenever Stilwell had formal orders for Detachment 101, he would recall the 
detachment commander to his headquarters for an in-depth course of action brief in 
support of NCAC’s conventional forces.  Such was the case with the planned seizure of 
Myitkyina airfield in which Detachment 101 would support Stilwell’s two Chinese 
Divisions and the American Marauders as they converged on to Myitkyina.57  Unlike the 
environment in the Philippines, this ability to meet face-to-face enabled commander and 
operator the opportunity to effectively communicate and coordinate all aspects of the 
operation to ensure unity of effort. 
Stilwell’s outward animosity toward the British commanders may have caused 
initial strains between Detachment 101 and British forces; however, the personalities of 
the 101 personnel, combined with their growing intelligence network, minimized the 
negative effects that such tensions caused.  The different Allied units that operated in the 
CBI Theater were subject to an overlapping web of confusion concerning who 
commanded what forces within a particular area of operations.  Detachment 101’s 
coordination and sometimes integration with British forces allowed it to develop 
relationships that mitigated friction with British commanders who felt that any units that 
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operated within their AOs fell strictly under British command.58  Whenever coordination 
did fail, Detachment 101’s expanding intelligence network averted any accidental 
friendly-on-friendly situations that might otherwise have occurred.  On at least one 
occasion, Detachment 101 Kachin guerrillas reported that Japanese forces were 
attempting to locate a British combat force in the area of the Imphal Front.  Detachment 
101 was working in the area and had reported its operations to British authorities prior to 
its departure; however, the British failed to communicate back that they, too, would be 
conducting operations in the vicinity.59 
Ironically, coordination of efforts proved more challenging in Burma than among 
the LGAF units in the Philippines due to conflicting opinions among the overlapping 
commands about how best to conduct offensive measures against the Japanese in the CBI 
Theater.  In the Philippines the LGAF had to work everything out among themselves on 
the ground.  This proved a blessing in disguise.  Yet, despite the sometimes poor 
coordination, Detachment 101’s direct authority under Stilwell and its diplomatic 
approach to British authorities alleviated much of the friction and confusion that might 
otherwise have plagued it – and did plague efforts in China. 
 
C. SUPPORTING ROLES 
 
1. Force Multiplier 
Much like the LGAF units in the Philippines, Detachment 101 would prove to be 
an exceptional force multiplier to the Allied effort in Burma.  What stands in contrast to 
the Philippines, however, was the intentional preplanned use of such an unconventional 
force in direct support of conventional units.  After Stilwell’s defeat in the first Burma 
campaign, Donovan determined that the Japanese fifth column’s espionage and sabotage 
operations had demoralized and exhausted the strength of Stilwell’s forces through the 
use of irregular tactics.  He soon convinced Stilwell that a similarly designed guerrilla-
type unit could provide invaluable assistance in support of Allied forces.60  Donovan’s 
                                                 
58 Peers and Brelis, 67.  Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines, 140-142. 
59 Peers and Brelis, 86. 
60 Corey Ford, Donovan of OSS, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 217. 
34 
vision and Stilwell’s recognition of the potential effectiveness of a simultaneous direct 
and indirect assault would shape the concept of operations for NCAC’s push to secure the 
Myitkyina airfield and break the Japanese hold on North Burma. 
Stilwell’s plan to retake Myitkyina would involve the effort of units derived from 
multiple nations.  The Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions would mount a direct assault 
through the Hukawng Valley while Merrill’s Marauders operated as a northern flanking 
force.  The 30th Chinese Division would be held in reserve with the added expectation 
that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would provide additional troops if required.  The 
British utilization of Orde Wingate’s Raiders, an irregular unit similar to Detachment 
101, was also taken into account for the diversionary role it was expected to play to the 
south of Myitkyina.  Stilwell ordered Detachment 101 to increase the size of its guerrilla 
force to 3000 strong and to provide timely intelligence prior to and throughout the battle 
as the Chinese and American forces pushed into the Japanese-held city.61  In addition to 
its intelligence gathering role, Detachment 101 Kachin guerrillas would provide 
incalculable assistance to the conventional assault elements by acting as guides, 
destroying enemy lines of communications, and laying ambushes to prevent Japanese 
reinforcements. 
As the Marauders and Chinese battled the Japanese in a conventional manner, the 
Kachin guerrillas applied their unorthodox methods of ambushes and raids to demoralize 
the enemy forces just as the Japanese had previously done to the British in the first 
Burma campaign.  For example, the guerrillas used anti-personnel mines provided by the 
OSS that would fire a .30 caliber round into the foot or body when stepped on.  These 
operations had an enormous psychological effect on the Japanese soldiers even when the 
numbers of ambushes were reduced and the mines were no longer used.  “The threat of 
guerrilla ambush made the Japanese taut and tense, slow, cautious and finally paranoiac.  
Several Japanese prisoners volunteered the opinion that in the jungle the [Japanese] 
forces so feared the guerrillas that they rated one Kachin equal to ten Japanese.”62 
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One of the most notable assets that the Detachment 101 guerrillas provided was 
the freedom of movement that the conventional forces gained from the unit’s operations.  
During the drive to Myitkyina, the native Kachin guerrillas owned the jungle like no 
other force.  Their knowledge of the environment and their small unit operations provided 
the eyes and ears and, most importantly, created confidence within the large conventional 
force to move relatively unimpeded through such arduous terrain.  The guerrilla force 
controlled the back trails and cut off Japanese reinforcements from the south as the 
Chinese and American Divisions moved unmolested to the objective. 
 
2. Disutility of SOF 
The benefit of implementing guerrilla activities and unconventional warfare 
within a unified campaign plan offers the commander the ability to execute an indirect 
approach that complements the direct approach of his conventional forces.  All too often, 
though, commanders do not understand the inherent limitations that exist with such 
irregular units.  This disutility of forces can lead to disastrous results if not properly 
identified and rectified by the operational commanders.  Such was the case with General 
Stilwell at various times throughout the 2nd Burma Campaign.   
For instance, the British Chindits were a unit designed to be similar to 
Detachment 101.  Originally intended by Major General Orde Wingate to be a long range 
penetration outfit, the Chindits were to establish a body of troops behind enemy lines and 
be re-supplied by air.  Their role in Burma was to disrupt the supply and logistics for 
frontline Japanese divisions through the destruction of roads, bridges, railways, 
ammunition stores, and convoys.63  The Chindits proved effective in this capacity in their 
support for Stilwell’s Chinese and American Divisions during the battle for Myitkyina.  
The unit was situated south of Myitkyina and disrupted the Japanese lines of 
communications and hampered their ability to reinforce their divisions with equipment 
and personnel.  Stilwell, however, then ordered the Chindits to attack the town of 
Mogaung, which was heavily fortified and controlled by the Japanese.  The undermanned 
Chindits bravely followed the general’s orders while suffering horrendous casualties.  
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Though they succeeded in capturing Mogaung, the entire unit was soon evacuated to 
hospitals due to the physical damage they suffered. 
Since Mountbatten disbanded the unit in early 1945, the seizure of Mogaung 
would be one of the last operations conducted by the Chindits.  This utilization of an 
unconventional force in a conventional manner highlights the disastrous effect that can 
come from a commander not comprehending the capabilities of his forces.  “Stilwell had 
totally misunderstood the purpose of the Chindits and the differences between the 
capabilities of a lightly armored, long-range penetration unit and a unit equipped and 
trained to take and hold ground.”64  This misuse of forces may have been averted if it 
were not for the untimely death of Wingate in the spring of 1944.  Wingate’s replacement 
was Major General Walter David Alexander Lentaigne, a man who was not in tune with 
Wingate’s methods or general philosophy.  Had Wingate still been alive when General 
Stilwell handed down his orders, it is likely that Wingate would have been in a much 
stronger position to argue against and reject that misappropriation of his force due to his 
dominant personality and his profound knowledge of the capabilities of his unorthodox 
unit.65  Personalities of commanders become critical factors in impressing upon others 
the inefficiencies that result from the disutility of forces. 
Similar to the Chindits, Detachment 101 also faced the conventionalization of its 
forces towards the end of the campaign as the Allied Forces began pushing south through 
Burma.  However, unlike the Chindits, Detachment 101 proved highly efficient and 
effective at adapting to a combined direct and indirect approach as its growing number of 
guerrillas accommodated such operations.  By 1945, the unit numbered a total of 250 
American officers, 750 American enlisted and 10,000 native guerrillas, who together 
comprised four battalions.66  After the relief of General Stilwell and the division of the 
CBI Theater into the India-Burma Theater and the China Theater, Lieutenant General 
Daniel I. Sultan was placed in command of the India-Burma Theater.  Sultan questioned  
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Detachment 101’s commander, then Colonel William R. Peers, as to whether the 
detachment could seize the Taunggyi-Kentung road while clearing the Japanese from the 
area.   
Wanting to achieve the objectives established by Sultan, Peers discussed options 
with his battalion commanders and developed a plan to combine the use of conventional 
and unconventional tactics.  Detachment 101’s final push south began in April of 1945.  
Peers pushed autonomy down to the battalion commanders and the battalions established 
no prescribed pattern of tactics; they simply adapted and applied whatever form of tactics 
the requirements and scheme of maneuvers called for.67  By June, through a combination 
of direct frontal assaults, raids, ambushes, and aerial bombardment, Detachment 101 had 
pushed the Japanese south to Taunggyi where the battalions linked up with the British 
64th Brigade.  Peers’ decision to allow his forces to be utilized in a conventional role was 
one that proved successful only after considerable consideration was given to his unit’s 
capabilities and how they might best adapt to an array of tactics.  Critical to the success 
and relatively low casualties incurred in this operation was the intelligence network that 
Detachment 101 had established over the previous three years; this network generated 
ample advance knowledge about Japanese strengths and dispositions.  Peers understood 
the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses as well as those of his own force, and Sultan’s 
consultation concerning the feasibility of such an operation provided the foundation for 
success. 
 
D. BURMA ANALYSIS 
 
1. Absence of Alternatives 
As previously discussed, the European Theater was the priority of the Allied 
effort while the CBI Theater struggled to gain the resources required to counter the 
Japanese advance.  Though General Stilwell may not have thought well of applying 
unconventional forces or techniques within Burma initially, his defeat in the first Burma 
Campaign and his inability to convince the strategic decision-makers to provide an 
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American Expeditionary Force most likely weighed heavily in his decision to accept 
General Donovan’s and the OSS’s proposals. 
Consequently, Stilwell’s inexperience with such an unorthodox unit may have 
indirectly played a role in his willingness to allow Detachment 101 to establish itself 
within the theater with only broad guidance from Stilwell himself.68  This enabled the 
detachment to recruit and train natives in a manner that avoided direct conventional 
intervention.  The low prioritization of Burma permitted this relationship between a 
conventional and unconventional command to persist through most of the war.  With no 
expeditionary force in sight, Detachment 101 effectively utilized a period of three years 
to establish and grow social contacts and recruit from a variety of native ethnic groups.  
Just as in the Philippines, this factor of time, that is so paramount when conducting an 
irregular campaign, enabled the development of an intelligence network reaching across 
the entire country of Burma, and continuously reported on Japanese positions and 
dispositions. 
 To the extent that Detachment 101 required time to organize its operations, so too 
did Stilwell as he sought to train the Chinese Divisions and press Washington for an 
American Division.  Detachment 101 provided Stilwell with the time and crucial 
intelligence reporting on Japanese forces to facilitate the NCAC commander’s ability to 
reorganize the Chinese Divisions and prepare an operational plan to retake Burma.  
Without this period of preparation, Stilwell’s egotistical personality may have pushed 
him towards recommitting troops to Burma with devastating results. 
 
2. Environmental Conditions 
As with conditions in the Philippines, Burma offered a favorable environment for 
an irregular force in which to operate.  Though not all Burmese were as indignant 
towards the Japanese as most Filipinos were, Detachment 101’s integration with the 
Kachin people and subsequent guerrilla operations allowed for a slow reversal in the 
Burmese people’s point of view.  The Japanese restricted the individual liberties of the 
Burmese more than the British had when they were the colonial power.  With every 
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guerrilla and espionage operation, the Burmese recognized and welcomed the return of 
Allied forces while slowly becoming more willing to rebel against the harsh Japanese.  
Critical in this ability to turn around the Burmese were the aggregate effects of 
Detachment 101 and British units.69  The fact that the British had long experience in 
Burma through colonial rule was essential in providing Detachment 101 with initial 
contacts to the Kachins.  The Kachins, in turn, were instrumental in Detachment 101 
operations throughout the war, comprising the majority of the guerrilla operators.  
Without their knowledge of the difficult jungle, back trails, and contacts across the 
country, Detachment 101 would not have been nearly as efficient and effective in 
conducting irregular operations. 
 
3. Division of Labor 
In the conduct of any campaign or operation where conventional and 
unconventional forces are used in unison, the appropriate division of labor ensures that 
each force’s strengths are maximized while the inherent complementary roles of the 
forces bolster and enhance each individual unit’s weaknesses.  Burma illustrates this 
through the integration of Detachment 101 with Stilwell’s NCAC.  A critical weakness to 
any conventional component is its ability to gather accurate and timely intelligence 
throughout all phases of an operation and campaign.  Alternatively, the limitation of an 
irregular force becomes the capacity with which it can be re-supplied in a similarly timely 
manner.  The strengths of regular and irregular forces are the former’s ability to place 
overwhelming fire power on target while the latter acts as a force multiplier through the 
use of indigenous forces. 
Detachment 101 and NCAC offer an example of how success can be achieved 
more efficiently through the coordination and merging of divergent capabilities.  The 
irregular units in Burma provided NCAC with 85 to 95 % of all usable intelligence and at 
various points in the war designated between 60 to 85 % of all targets attacked by the 10th 
Air Force, while additionally relaying accurate bomb damage assessment reports.70  In 
supporting the guerrilla efforts across Northern Burma and the eventual southern push in 
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1944, NCAC continuously provided air drops to re-supply the units with weapons, 
ammunition, food, and water.  In North Burma when air crews’ morale begin to dissipate 
with the loss of personnel and aircraft from attacks by Japanese Zero’s, Detachment 101 
commanders gave personal assurances that their irregular unit would go in and recover 
any downed pilot in the Burma Theater.71  This mutual appreciation of efforts and trust 
established a binding relationship that remained strong throughout the campaign. 
Finally, a great deal of credit for the successful and competent integration of 
Detachment 101 and the conventional Allied Forces in Burma must be attributed to the 
continuity developed at the commander level.  As was the case in the Philippines, very 
few changes at the operational commander level took place during the 3 ½ year 
engagement in Burma.  NCAC was commanded by Stilwell until his replacement in 1944 
by Sultan, and Detachment 101 was similarly commanded by only two people, Eifler and 
Peers, up until the unit’s disbandment in 1945.  The stability at the commander position 
nurtured a mutual respect and admiration of each force’s unique capabilities that was 
initially non-existent.  Each developed an understanding and appreciation for one 
another’s attributes and personalities, enabling a smoother working relationship and thus 
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IV. WARS OF TODAY: AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 have made for stark comparisons to the attack 
of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese in 1941.  It is not completely clear whether Osama bin 
Laden’s attack against the U.S. was an attempt to force a policy of isolationism and deter 
the U.S. from engaging in Arab countries around the world; however, many have 
surmised that this was al-Qaeda’s goal, as were the similar intentions of the Japanese to 
keep the U.S. out of W.W. II.  Regardless, the reality of the aftermath of 9/11 has proved 
reminiscent to the response of Pearl Harbor.  September 11, 2001 united the American 
public, who expected and demanded swift retaliatory strikes against al-Qaeda and the 
Afghanistan Taliban regime that provided safe haven for al-Qaeda’s recruitment, training, 
and planning.  Within one month of the 9/11 attacks, SOF teams were on the ground in 
Afghanistan working by, with, and through Northern Alliance units in preparation for 
combined offensive combat operations against the Taliban.72  In coordination with 
Northern Alliance forces, small numbers of SOF teams directed precision air strikes 
against Taliban infrastructure targets that ultimately led to the fall of the Taliban 
government in December of 2001.  Ongoing operations to destroy a resurgent Taliban 
and al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan along with reconstruction and stability operations 
continue as of the time of this thesis submittal. 
If 9/11 was an attempt to withdraw the U.S. presence from around the world, the 
opposite effect is what soon occurred.  One year after al-Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. 
Homeland, President George W. Bush signed the 2002 National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (2002 NSS).  Preemption, not isolation, became the dominant 
foreign policy of the U.S., which sought to engage imminent threats abroad.  Though the 
U.S. has always maintained the option of preemption, past policies’ foundations were 
built to counter a traditional or conventional enemy and threat.  The 2002 NSS 
specifically identifies rogue states and terrorists as the new threats and addresses these 
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adversaries as enemies who do not follow the principle norms of the law of armed 
conflict.  NSS 2002 regards inaction as a greater risk than action, even when uncertainty 
about a specific imminent danger exists.73 
Thus, the 2002 NSS set the stage for the invasion of Iraq as the U.S. government 
and its allies perceived that Iraq’s unmonitored Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
program presented an imminent danger to the U.S. and its allies.  I do not attempt to 
argue for or against the reasoning behind invading Iraq; I am only analyzing the 
coordination, integration, and effectiveness of conventional and unconventional forces 
once the decision to invade was made by President Bush.  On March 19, 2003, U.S. and 
Coalition forces began a bombing campaign, with a land campaign soon to follow to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power and secure Iraq’s WMD program.  As in the 1991 
Gulf War, Iraqi forces proved to be vastly inferior to those of the U.S. and Coalition 
forces, as the predominately U.S. and British coalition pushed through Iraqi defenses 
relatively easily in only a three week period; Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003.  On May 1, 
2003 aboard the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush prematurely declared: 
“Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and 
our allies have prevailed.”74  The irony of the president’s remarks is represented by the 
number of Coalition soldiers who have died in Iraq since the president’s declaration: 
2360, as compared to only 173 in the first phase of the war.75  The removal of Saddam’s 
regime created a security vacuum that enabled loyal Sunni Bathists to spawn an 
insurgency aided by foreign fighters infiltrated into Iraq, many of whom have direct ties 
to al-Qaeda.  Since May 1, 2003 Coalition forces have had limited successes in defeating 
the growing insurgency as raids, suicide bombings, and religious tensions continue to 
increase and are creating fears that civil war may erupt throughout Iraq. 
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This chapter offers a preliminary examination of the similarities and the 
differences between the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq on the one hand, and the 
campaigns in the Philippines and Burma on the other.  In particular, I discuss the factors 
of environmental conditions, force capabilities, increased technological 
advantages/disadvantages, coordination, integration, and unity of effort.  I focus 
specifically on the integration of current conventional and unconventional forces at both 
the strategic and operational levels from before invasion through current operations.  
Recommendations for future improvements to increase effective and efficient integration 
will be outlined in Chapter V. 
 
B. AFGHANISTAN  
 
1. Environmental Conditions 
As was the case for the Philippines and Burma, an absence of alternatives drove 
the use of unconventional forces to begin combat operations in Afghanistan.  However, 
unlike the Philippines and Burma, Afghanistan was not a lower priority than other 
engagements around the world.  In fact, it was the only immediate priority.  September 
11, 2001 produced obvious pressures from the American public to act decisively and 
quickly.  These pressures in and of themselves helped force the decision makers in 
Washington to put American boots on the ground in Afghanistan as swiftly as possible.76  
Afghanistan’s geographic location made it nearly impossible to launch mechanized 
battalions across the borders.  SOF forces became the only means by which to infiltrate 
the country with a relatively small footprint and reduced logistical support. 
Another crucial dimension of the environment in Afghanistan was a flattened 
hierarchy for decision-making and force-planning from early October 2001 to March of 
2002.  Conventional forces supported the SOF infiltration with aerial firepower 
superiority and supply drops; however, the conventional forces’ typical structure with 
many bureaucratic layers above the war-fighter was absent due to their inability to reach 
the battlefield.  SOF forces were given an almost unprecedented degree of autonomy 
against an enemy that many feared, given their past successes against the British and the                                                   
76 Bob Andrews, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict; Interview conducted on 28 February 2006. 
44 
Soviets.  This dilution of central control and limited guidance enabled the SOF 
professionals to conduct their type of warfare without the external restraints that usually 
inhibit unconventional warfare.77 
The final key piece of the Afghanistan environment was the availability of an 
indigenous force by, through, and with which SOF personnel could work.  The Northern 
Alliance and local Afghan tribes provided the proxy force necessary for conducting 
offensive operations to remove the Taliban from power.  The motivation of the Northern 
Alliance and various tribes enabled SOF personnel to build a rapport with these forces 
that evolved rather quickly in a territory and culture that was quite alien to U.S. forces 
who entered the country so soon after 9/11.  In some instances, U.S. forces landed in 
Afghanistan, linked up with anti-Taliban forces, and were conducting integrated combat 
operations within hours of the initial meeting.78  Similar to the Philippines and Burma, 
SOF personnel were able to utilize indigenous people as not only a force multiplier, but 
to increase their awareness and understanding of a territory that U.S. personnel had very 
little experience in.  Thanks to the existence of SOF forces post-W.W. II, these 
unconventional warfare capabilities have been enhanced and institutionalized within a 
small segment of the U.S. military and have greatly reduced the “learn as you go” 
conduct of unconventional warfare.  The initial months of the Afghanistan War 
demonstrated what a limited number of highly trained unconventional forces could 
achieve by working autonomously with local entities while being supplied with adequate 
support from conventional assets.  Yet, these successes became limited once the gateway 
to Afghanistan opened up to additional forces and the conduct of war grew convoluted 
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2. Unity of Effort 
The early stages of Afghanistan demonstrated an exceptional unity of effort 
between conventional and unconventional forces.  Precision air strikes guided by small 
SOF teams on the ground decapitated the organizational structure of the Taliban and 
decimated the Taliban’s ability to hold any significant ground.  In fact, the early offensive 
operations proceeded so quickly that the U.S. State Department urged the operational 
commanders to slow down the offensive in order for the State Department to negotiate 
with the Taliban.79  Some have argued that despite the use of indigenous forces to 
support the American advancement, Afghanistan was much more a conventional battle 
than an unconventional one.  Stephen Biddle notes that “…it [Afghanistan] was a 
surprisingly orthodox air-ground theater campaign in which heavy fire support decided a 
contest between two land forces.”80  I fully agree with Mr. Biddle’s initial assessment; 
however, I believe that the relationships forged between the Afghan irregular forces and 
U.S. SOF personnel were the foundation for an unconventional war plan that never 
completely emerged.  Also, the successful targeting by air assets could not have been 
achieved as effectively if it were not for the unconventional elements that where on the 
ground providing the targeting and battle damage assessment reports.  The conventional 
war assessment would dilute the gains garnered over the first months of the war as the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda forces retreated back into the population and various safe havens, at 
the same time that U.S. conventional components fell in on top of the SOF structure. 
The success of the “air-ground campaign” forced the enemy to de-conventionalize 
and adopt “hit and run” guerrilla tactics that had proved so successful against the Soviets 
in the early 80’s.  Ironically, this dispersed enemy was soon countered by a centralized 
command and control structure as more and more U.S. and Coalition forces poured into 
Afghanistan and began basing out of Bagram Airfield under the newly formed CJSOTF- 
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Afghanistan.  SOF units began losing their autonomous operational capabilities that had 
proved so historically successful in the first months of the war as the approval process 
became more layered.81 
In addition to the bureaucracy that conventional commanders brought into 
Afghanistan was the conventionalization of operations that began to flow out of Bagram.  
OPERATION ANACONDA is one such example where a combined SOF and brigade-
size operation was planned to flush out Taliban and al-Qaeda from their encampments in 
the Shah-i-Khot valley.  What began as a two day operation turned in to two weeks of 
heavy fighting and significant casualties for U.S. troops and equipment, thanks to poor 
coordination and confusing command and control mechanisms. 
Over time as the Iraq War has received greater attention and resources, 
Afghanistan has become a lower priority theater, similar to the Philippines and Burma, 
and, although this has reduced some operational inefficiencies, much is left to be 
accomplished to reverse what occurred when a larger footprint was established on the 
ground.  As Dr. Kalev I. Sepp puts it: “Paradoxically, once the enemy was beaten in open 
combat and had transitioned to guerrilla warfare, the U.S. Central Command placed 
conventional division and corps commanders in overall charge of military operations in 
Afghanistan.”82  Afghanistan began as an enormous success; serious reverses are likely to 
occur unless recognition of the type of enemy currently being fought is correctly 
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Planning for the Iraq War took on a one dimensional shape that was heavily 
weighted towards a conventional style of warfare that would make use of the superiority 
of advanced technological weapons systems.  The war planning was essentially a dusting 
off of the previous 1991 Gulf War plan with obvious modifications aimed at securing 
Baghdad and removing Saddam from power.  Fresh from successes in Afghanistan, SOF 
units would play a much more significant role than what they were allowed to provide in 
1991; however, their role was being planned by conventional commanders as one 
involving more direct action (DA) than unconventional warfare (UW).  The perception 
within the “Beltway” (and Pentagon) was that Iraq would be the conventional 
commanders’ war that they did not get to fight in Afghanistan.  For instance, the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict 
(ASD/SOLIC) was left out of the initial planning process for the invasion.83  In 
ASD/SOLIC’s place, conventional planners focused on the utility of SOF in Phase I of 
the war (which would be DA intensive) and placed less emphasis on the reconstruction 
and stability operations capabilities that these forces could bring to bear through 
unconventional methods of engaging with and influencing the population. 
The failures to look beyond the conventional military victory were based on 
extremely optimistic predictions about what would occur after Saddam’s removal from 
power.  Vice President Dick Cheney stated on March 16, 2003 during the taping of 
NBC’s Meet the Press: “I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators.”84  This 
mindset has since been ascertained to have been shared by policy makers and military 
decision makers alike prior to the invasion.  Unfortunately, such a view completely 
missed the possibility, never mind likelihood, that an insurgency might emerge, and this 
made little to no preparations to defend against it.  Instead, sectarian and ethnic tensions 
across Iraq and the Muslim world were downplayed and it was assumed that the Iraqi 
government would quickly recover in order to secure and stabilize the country. 
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The nation’s most senior military commanders compounded these 
problems by planning for the conventional defeat of the enemy and an 
early exit from Iraq, by making a deliberate effort to avoid “Phase IV” and 
stability operations.  The fact they did so to minimize the strain on the US 
force posture, and the “waste” of US troops on “low priority” missions 
played a major role in creating the conditions under which insurgency 
could develop and flourish.85 
 
2. Force Capabilities/Technology 
Today’s U.S. and Coalition forces are much better prepared and trained to 
conduct counterinsurgency operations than the W.W. II soldiers of Detachment 101 and 
the LGAF in Burma and the Philippines.  The Cold War era produced a litany of low-
intensity conflicts that ultimately helped advance unconventional warfare capabilities 
through additional studies and operational experiences of SOF personnel.   Paramount in 
a counterinsurgency strategy is the ability to identify and separate the insurgents from the 
population.  To achieve this, the counterinsurgency force must win the hearts and minds 
of the population who can provide the intelligence required to separate the two.  This may 
be accomplished in a number of ways; however, two essential elements involve security 
for the population and garnering support from the population so that those afflicted 
understand that this is their fight, and it is they, who will directly benefit, not the country 
that is providing the counterinsurgency force and advisors.   Americans in the Philippines 
and Burma achieved both aims by empowering the indigenous forces to converse with 
and influence the population on a regular basis.  Current U.S. and Coalition forces 
certainly have not maximized this capability to nearly the extent possible. 
In analyzing the first element, security, the U.S. and Coalition forces are failing in 
this critical area.  The focus in Iraq has been to kill or drive out insurgents in dangerous 
“Red Zone” areas around the country.  Fallujah is the prime example of this typical 
conventional warfare approach in which the taking of the city fulfilled the immediate 
objective, but U.S. forces failed to fall back and secure the city to prevent insurgents from 
reoccupying it.  This plays into the insurgents’ hands as they can replenish their losses 
and still access the population at a later date.  True attrition of insurgent forces occurs 
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when a security apparatus is in place after the clearance operations, and thus the 
insurgents are isolated from future access to the population.86 
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) must take the lead in security operations for a number 
of critical reasons. First, it is essential for the Iraqi population to see that the 
counterinsurgency effort is an Iraqi effort and not solely a U.S. and Coalition endeavor.  
This requires aggressive recruitment strategies in order to bolster the number of ISF 
personnel required to eventually conduct independent operations across Iraq.  If the U.S. 
and Coalition forces continue to undertake the majority of these operations, Andrew 
Krepinevich points out that “This may enhance the insurgents’ appeal to Iraqi 
nationalism, in that they can claim the Coalition is acting on its own behalf and not with 
the support of the Iraqi people.”87  Once the ISF have established a more dominant role, 
they will be in a better position than the Coalition forces to establish intelligence 
networks throughout the Iraqi population due to higher cultural awareness and inherent 
trust within their own society. 
This strategy requires full cooperation, coordination, and integration between U.S. 
and Coalition conventional and unconventional forces to properly implement and execute 
a campaign plan that utilizes the capabilities of a variety of differentiated units.  A 
counterinsurgency campaign in an environment the size of Iraq cannot be accomplished 
through SOF alone.  An “Oil Spot” strategy requires moving beyond secure perimeters 
and actively engaging the population and the insurgents on a multitude of fronts.  
Advanced intelligence and weapon systems technology have their limits when arrayed 
against an unconventional opponent.  The challenge of operating in this size of an 
environment may require conventional and unconventional forces (Coalition and ISF 
combined) to integrate into small teams: SOF personnel bringing in the expertise in this 
type of warfare and conventional forces reducing the manpower burden that such an 
operation would bring to bear.  The true challenge lies with the operational commander’s 
ability to accept an unconventional approach that may call for his conventional units 
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falling under control of an unconventional structure that has been granted greater 















































The lessons that history can potentially provide elicit different opinions from 
various military and academic intellectuals.  Some argue that the space of time impairs 
the ability to apply lessons of the past in current conflicts due to societal, industrial, and 
international contextual changes that have occurred between such periods of time.  I favor 
the opinions of those who feel that there is still much to learn from past events.  As John 
Arquilla states, “…there has been a tendency to neglect the treasure trove of older case 
studies of special operations, which may prove useful sources of insight and 
understanding.”88  War is not new, but an ancient art that every society has either 
encountered directly or felt the effects of indirectly.  Though technological advances have 
changed many aspects of the conduct of modern war, the integration of differentiated 
units remains paramount to being able to develop a strategy that forces an opponent to 
sue for peace, or that relegates his cause as irrelevant. 
Today’s modern U.S. military is likely to continue to struggle to stabilize 
Afghanistan and Iraq against “inferior” enemies who lack the technological war-fighting 
resources that are so abundant within the U.S. arsenal.  Though W.W. II is an era far 
removed from 2006, the experiences and relationships forged between conventional and 
unconventional units in the Philippines and Burma provide the valuable “insights and 
understanding” that Arquilla, among others, deems important.  Detachment 101 and the 
LGAF’s coordination with conventional components and use of indigenous forces created 
a unity of effort and force multiplier effect in two environments that were void of an 
overwhelming Allied presence, unlike those to be found in other theaters.  The 
Philippines provides a study in which absence of alternatives guided commanders’ 
utilization of unconventional forces, whereas Stilwell’s lack of resources in Burma 
opened him up to recognizing the effectiveness that small units could provide his 
conventional forces through coordination with Donovan. 
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As increasing numbers of citizens and politicians alike begin to call for the 
reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq, an invisible stopwatch has began to count down, and the 
time to achieve “success” grows scarcer by the minute.  Inherent in the creation of 
democratic governance in Afghanistan and Iraq is those countries’ ability to develop their 
own independent security apparatus to defend against adversaries who oppose a 
democratic government solution.  Iraq appears to face the greatest challenge as sectarian 
divisions continue to impede this.  The solution has moved beyond a strictly 
“conventional” or “unconventional” strategy for uniting these religious and ethnic 
segments, and a fully integrated process must begin to take shape to produce the unity of 
effort amongst U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi forces if stability is to be achieved.  Efficiency 
and effectiveness will continue to degrade unless the efforts of “finding, fixing, killing, 




The Philippines and Burma case studies provide detailed descriptions of how 
conventional and unconventional units came together and fed off each others’ 
capabilities.  Most of the knowledge attained in order to competently merge these 
capabilities derived from either “war-time” experience or was proposed in advance by a 
charismatic leader like Donovan.  There is a greater need to educate today’s SOF and 
conventional commanders as to the capabilities that each can provide the other.  Too 
often, each distinct force becomes pigeon-holed in its respective environment and fails to 
proactively engage with its counterparts to increase their respective knowledge of the 
other units’ attributes.  The case studies in this thesis identify many critical factors that 
led to success in the Philippines and Burma: 
• Continuity at the operational commander level 
• Long duration deployment of forces 
• Intelligence fusion and support 
• A clear division of labor 
• The recognition of force multiplier effects 
• The adverse consequences of misutilizing forces 
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Critical in comprehending the lessons learned through history is the ability to 
teach the leaders of today and tomorrow why they should want to coordinate.  They must 
also, of course, understand the cultural, organizational, and operational aspects of their 
respective counter-disciplines of warfare. 
I propose three solutions to enable an increased understanding and proper 
utilization of differentiated forces that may be instituted under either peacetime or 
wartime conditions.  First, Professional Military Education (PME) for conventional 
officers must move beyond the Service Academies and War Colleges.  Unconventional 
warfare courses are mostly absent from the curriculums offered by these institutions.  The 
Naval Postgraduate School offers a curriculum in Irregular Warfare, through the Defense 
Analysis Department, that is increasingly opening enrollment billets for non-SOF 
officers.  This program will not only educate conventionally minded officers about 
irregular warfare, but will simultaneously help foster relationships and indirect education 
through daily contact between non-SOF and SOF counterparts. 
Second, mandatory disassociated tours for both conventional and unconventional 
officers must be implemented in a 20 year career.  This will once again not only build 
relationships via cross-cultural interaction, but will enable the respective officers to better 
appreciate organizational dynamics.  They will also be bringing in outside expertise and 
experience in an attempt to break down some of the inherent biases that exist within such 
organizations.  Specifically for SOF, unconventional warfare expertise must be integrated 
more at the Geographic Combatant Commander level to serve as a through-put, or 
liaison, for the Theater Special Operations Commands. 
Finally, U.S. military forces must continue to increase joint integrated exercise 
operations from the staff level all the way down to the individual operational units.  
These different elements should not be meeting for the first time in a combat zone, as 
many often do.  It is vital that these units receive interoperability training prior to 
engagement in order to solidify the unity of effort required to properly execute their 
respective roles within a campaign strategy.  Whenever this proves difficult to 
accomplish prior to deployment, every effort must be made for them to engage with one 
another upon immediate arrival in theater. 
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The recommendations I have proposed seem relatively simple when placed on 
paper; however, all too often in the past egoism, elitism, and the need for secrecy within 
units have created insurmountable barriers that have prevented the efficient and effective 
integration of forces.  Though these barriers may never come down completely, they 
must at least be managed to a level where one can climb over.  Technology and attritional 
warfare continue to be the focus of U.S. military ideology and the focus of 
transformational suggestions for the conduct of future warfare.  However, enemies of the 
future are viewing the impact that the low-tech enemy of today is having on opinion, 
support, and morale of the U.S.; both domestically and internationally.  Given the 
changes that occurred post-W.W. I and II in an attempt to minimize casualties and 
develop a more efficient manner of warfare, it will be interesting to see whether the 
U.S.’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq will now push senior military decision makers 
to give more credence to aspects of irregular warfare.  Will these leaders be more open to 
irregular solutions in an effort to provide better efficiency and effectiveness, or will 
attritional warfare maintain its dominance in military thinking as has been the case in 
every post-war era?  If assurances of open-mindedness towards unorthodox approaches 
and solutions can not be made within military circles, then it is obligatory for the 
National Command Authority to institute its influence and authority over military 
decision makers to ensure that the lessons of the past and present are not forgotten or 
ignored.   
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
During my attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), numerous 
presentations, course discussions, and outside class peer discussions, combined with my 
reading of first-person accounts, and interviews, made me aware of an apparent growing 
animosity within the SOCOM community between those with unconventional warfare 
(UW) backgrounds and those who favor direct action (DA).  I think it would be an 
interesting thesis project to delve into the SOCOM organization and the different units 
that fall under SOCOM to examine the roles, cultures, and organizational constructs of 
the various Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint, and now Marine components of SOCOM.  
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Specifically, how well are we integrating as a community?  Is there truly a division 
developing between UW and DA operators, or is a preponderance of effort heavily 
favored towards one; and what implications may this have for the future?  Are specific 
commands like Army Special Forces and Naval Special Warfare experiencing 
degradation in their traditional UW and maritime special operations skills respectively; 
and are these SOCOM forces losing their niches as roles become more identical across 
certain units, or is it merely current operational requirements driving expanding 
operational capabilities?  In any event, my short duration at NPS precluded me from 
examining these topics in greater detail; yet, further research in these areas would likely 
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